The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example by Hendin, Herbert
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 35 




The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example 
Herbert Hendin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 Duq. L. Rev. 427 (1996). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol35/iss1/17 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example
Herbert Hendin*
Once physician-assisted suicide is legally permitted for
patients designated as terminally ill, the gradual extension of
the practice to ever widening groups of patients has been
referred to as the slippery slope. The Netherlands, where doctors
are able to practice euthanasia as long as they follow certain
established guidelines,1 provides the only empirical example of
what the slippery slope means in actual practice.
Over the past two decades, Dutch law and Dutch medicine
have evolved from accepting assisted suicide to accepting eutha-
nasia, from euthanasia for terminally ill patients to euthanasia
for chronically ill individuals, from euthanasia for physical ill-
ness to euthanasia for psychological distress, and from voluntary
euthanasia to the practice and conditional acceptance of
nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Once the Dutch per-
mitted assisted suicide, it was not possible medically, legally or
morally to deny more active medical help such as euthanasia to
individuals who could not effect their own deaths.2
The Dutch could also not deny assisted suicide or euthanasia
to the chronically ill, who have longer to suffer than the
terminally ill, or to individuals who have psychological pain not
associated with physical disease. To refuse assisted suicide or
euthanasia to these individuals would be a form of
discrimination.
Although involuntary euthanasia has not been legally sanc-
tioned by the Dutch, it has increasingly been justified or excused
* Executive Director, American Suicide Foundation; Professor of Psychiatry,
New York Medical College.
1. A series of court cases in the 1970's and 1980's, including a Dutch Supreme
Court decision in 1984, established a legal justification for assisted suicide and euthana-
sia based on force majeure, i.e., the doctor found it necessary to put the welfare of the
patient above the penal code which made assisted suicide and euthanasia a crime. More
recently, a statute was enacted specifically exempting physicians from the provisions of
the code if they followed prescribed guidelines.




as necessary by the need to relieve suffering patients who are not
competent to choose a course of action for themselves.
The inability to regulate euthanasia within established rules
is even more slippery. Virtually every guideline established by
the Dutch, whether it be a voluntary, well-considered, persistent
request; intolerable suffering that cannot be relieved; consulta-
tion; or the reporting of cases, has failed to protect patients or
has been modified or violated with impunity.
The Remmelink Report, which is the Dutch government's offi-
cial commissioned study of euthanasia, revealed that more than
half of Dutch physicians consider it appropriate to introduce the
subject of euthanasia to their patients.' The doctors seem not to
recognize that they are also telling the patient that his or her life
is not worth living, a message that has a powerful effect on the
patient's outlook and decision.
In a study of euthanasia conducted in Dutch hospitals, doctors
and nurses reported that more euthanasia requests came from
the families of patients than the patients themselves. The inves-
tigator for the study concluded that the families, the doctors and
the nurses were involved in pressuring patients to request
euthanasia.4
A Dutch medical journal noted an example of a wife who no
longer wished to care for her sick husband and gave her husband
a choice between euthanasia and admission to a home for the
chronically ill. The husband, afraid of being left to the mercy of
strangers in an unfamiliar place, chose to be killed. The hus-
band's doctor, although aware of the coercion, ended his patient's
life.'
With regard to intolerable and unrelievable patient suffering,
the Dutch courts have decided that only the patient can decide
what suffering is intolerable, as the right to do so is an expres-
sion of the patient's autonomy. If the patient's autonomy is the
guiding principle and the determination of unbearable pain and
suffering is so subjective, then it is understandable why the
Dutch have found it hard to deny any competent person, whether
visibly sick or apparently healthy, the right to choose
euthanasia.
Moreover, suffering can be deemed unrelievable in the Nether-
lands simply because the patient refuses relief and treatment. In
3. P.J. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., EUTHANASIA AND OTHER MEDICAL DECISIONS CON-
CERNING THE END OF LIFE (1992).
4. H.W. HnuoRsT, EuTHANAsrE IN BET ZrEKENnIIs [EuTHANASIA IN THE
HosPrrAL](1983).
5. H. TEN HAVE & G. KiMsM, GENEESKUNDE: TUSSEN DROOM EM DRAMA [MEDICAL
SCIENCE: BETWEEN DREAM AND DRAMAl 83-84 (1985).
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a recent case, a Dutch court acquitted Boudewijn Chabot,6a psy-
chiatrist who assisted in the suicide of a healthy fifty-year-old
woman who recently lost her son to cancer. The woman had
refused all treatment and stated that she would accept help only
in dying. The woman was assisted in suicide within four months
of her son's death. Her refusal of treatment was considered to
make her suffering unrelievable. Of course, the woman's refusal
was influenced by the knowledge that if she was persistent, her
request would be granted. Even without treatment, experience
has shown that time alone was likely to have affected the
woman's wish to die.
John Keown, an English legal scholar who found the Dutch
imprecise and lax in the enforcement of their self-imposed guide-
lines, interviewed Herbert Cohen, a leading Dutch euthanasia
practitioner. Keown asked Cohen if he would perform euthana-
sia on a patient who requested it because the patient felt like a
nuisance to relatives, who wanted the patient dead so that they
could enjoy the patient's estate. Cohen indicated that he would
"because that kind of influence-these children wanting their
money now-is the same kind of power from the past that shaped
us all." Keown points out that if a leading Dutch authority on
euthanasia can interpret the guidelines requiring "an entirely
free and voluntary request" and "unbearable suffering" in this
way, "little more need be said about their inherent vagueness
and elasticity."
7
Consultation in euthanasia cases is often only for the sake of
form, thus the consulting doctor often does not see the patient at
all. In response to criticism about this situation, the Royal Dutch
Medical Association has issued revised guidelines that urge doc-
tors who give a second opinion in such cases to actually see the
patient, stating that a telephone conversation with the referring
doctor should not be sufficient.' Of course, this revision is an
indirect admission of how casual and predetermined such consul-
tations in euthanasia cases have been. Consultation offers the
patient little protection in the Netherlands anyway. In cases
where the details are available, the consultant is usually a
6. Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and the Dutch Cure, 10
IssuEs IN L. & MED. 123-68 (1994).
7. John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery
Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHIcAL, LEGAL, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES, 265 (J.
Keown ed., 1995).
8. KNMG GUIDELINES ON ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EuTHANASiA (August 1995).
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euthanasia advocate who routinely confirms proceeding with the
process without conducting a truly independent evaluation.9
Despite changes in the law that ensure Dutch doctors will not
be prosecuted if they follow guidelines, 50% of Dutch doctors do
not report their euthanasia cases. Further, 20% of the doctors
say that they will not do so under any circumstances.' 0
Dr. Carlos Gomez, an American physician who studied eutha-
nasia in the Netherlands, listened to the presentation of the
details of twenty-six cases presented to him by physicians and
others who had been involved in a euthanasia decision. Gomez
found that: (1) guidelines on such topics as "unbearable suffer-
ing" were flexibly interpreted; (2) alternatives were often not pro-
vided to patients so that euthanasia would only be a "last resort;"
(3) consultants were not always used in euthanasia cases and
when they were, there was no way of assuring the consultant's
independence from the primary physician; and (4) euthanasia
cases were not routinely reported to the public prosecutor as
required."-
Guidelines cannot regulate euthanasia or protect patients.
Once euthanasia has been performed, only the patient and the
doctor may know the actual facts of the case and only the doctor
is alive to relate them; therefore, any medical or legal body
reviewing the case will, as in the Netherlands, only know what
the doctor chooses to tell them. 
12
Social sanction has encouraged patients and doctors to view
assisted suicide and euthanasia, which were intended to be
unfortunate necessities in exceptional cases, as almost a routine
method of dealing with seriously or terminally ill patients. In
the Netherlands, the easy solution of euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide has led to a third kind of slippage: a diminution in the qual-
ity of and pressure for palliative care, which became one of the
first casualties of euthanasia." Hospice care has indeed been
virtually non-existent in the Netherlands.
14
Ignorance of how to care for terminally ill patients influences
the attitudes of most physicians toward assisted suicide and
euthanasia. A study has shown that the more physicians know
9. Herbert Hendin, Selling Death and Dignity, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19-23;
Hendin; see also supra note 6.
10. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., supra note 3, at 49, table 5.14.
11. CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991).
12. Hendin, supra note 6.
13. B. Zylicz, Euthanasia, 338 LANCET 1150 (1991); K.L. Dorrepaal et al., Pain
Experience and Pain Management Among Hospitalized Cancer Patients, 63 CANCER 593-
95 (1988).
14. John Keown, supra note 7; B. ZYLCZ, PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS (1996).
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about palliative care, which includes the ability to deal with
patients' fears of death, the less apt physicians are to favor legal-
izing assisted suicide and euthanasia. 15
Recently, this author saw a vivid example in the Netherlands
of how knowledge and experience affects decisions for euthana-
sia. At a small, international workshop that addressed problems
in the care of the terminally ill, two American cases were
presented in which terminally ill patients requested assisted
suicide.
In one case, a man was confined to a wheelchair with advanced
symptoms of AIDS that included cystic lung infection, severe
pain due to inflammation of the nerves in his limbs and marked
weight loss. By the physician's appropriate prescription of ster-
oids, anti-depressants and psychological sensitivity in dealing
with the man's fears of abandonment, the patient was enabled to
gain weight, be free of his pain and wheel chair and live an addi-
tional ten months, for which he was grateful.'
6
In another case, a woman with great pain due to lung cancer
invading her chest wall requested assisted suicide. A nerve block
relieved the woman's pain, and she was happy to be able to leave
the hospital and live her remaining months at home.
17
A Dutch ethicist at the workshop asked if raising alternatives
to assisted suicide was not paternalistic and did not compromise
the patient's autonomy in the above cases. The author later
presented these cases to several euthanasia advocates in the
Netherlands. The advocates agreed initially that the patient in
the first case had a right to have euthanasia performed, but after
they heard the actual outcome of the case were not so sure. In
the second case, most of the advocates would not perform eutha-
nasia as they were aware that a nerve block could provide relief
to the patient. The advocates felt free to ignore patient auton-
omy when they knew of a way to help the patient.
Patient autonomy was in essence the rationale for assisted sui-
cide when doctors felt helpless and did not know what else to do.
This seems a powerful argument for educating doctors about how
to better handle such cases, not for legalizing assisted suicide.
Many people assume that a doctor who encourages or supports
assisted suicide makes as objective a judgment as does a radiolo-
15. R.K. PORTENOY ET AL., Determinants of the Willingness to Endorse Assisted Sui-
cide: A Survey of Physicians, Nurses, and Social Workers, PSYCHOSOmATICS, in press,
1996.
16. Carlos Gomez, case presented at Conference on Care of the Terminally Ill, (Bel-
lagio, Italy, July 19-23, 1996).
17. Kathleen Foley, case presented at Conference on Care of the Terminally Ill,
(Bellagio, Italy, July 19-23, 1996).
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gist when reading an x-ray. The decisive role of the physician's
attitudes and values in the decision for euthanasia is not appar-
ent to them.
For example, how a physician presents possible alternatives to
a patient requesting euthanasia is as important as whether the
alternatives are presented at all. In Death on Request, a eutha-
nasia case filmed for television viewing worldwide, a Dutch doc-
tor who is shown putting to death a patient diagnosed with
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis says of the patient: "I can give him
the finest wheelchair there is, but in the end it is only a stopgap.
He's going to die and he knows it."'8 The patient's death may
have been years away, but clearly a doctor with this attitude is
not someone to present alternatives to a patient.
Early in the author's work in the Netherlands, the author was
shown another film, Appointment with Death,'9 by the Dutch
Voluntary Euthanasia Society. Although the film was intended
to promote euthanasia, it provided an example of how a physi-
cian's inability to deal with a patient's fear of death led to a pre-
mature ending of the patient's life.
A forty-one-year-old artist was diagnosed as HIV positive. The
man had no physical symptoms, but had seen other individuals
suffer with HIV .symptoms and, therefore, wanted a physician's
assistance in dying. The doctor compassionately explained to the
patient that he might live for some years symptom-free.
Over time, the patient repeated the request for euthanasia and
eventually the patient's doctor conceded to the request. The
patient was clearly depressed and overwhelmed by the news of
his situation. Although the doctor kept establishing that the
patient was persistent in his request and competent to make the
decision, which are criteria a Dutch patient must meet, he did
not address the patient's terror that underlay the decision.
Consultation in the above case was just a matter of form. A
colleague of the doctor's saw the patient briefly merely to confirm
his euthanasia wish. Had this patient had a psychologically sen-
sitive physician able to deal with more than just whether the
patient met the formal criteria with respect to a request to die,
more likely in a culture not so accepting of euthanasia, this
patient would not have needed to be put to death.2 °
The doctor in the above case thought that the patient was act-
ing unwisely and prematurely. Not knowing how to deal with
18. Death on Request, Ikon Television Network, 1994.
19. An Appointment with Death, K.A. Productions, 1993.
20. Hendin, supra note 2.
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the patient's terror, however, he rationalized that out of respect
for the patient's autonomy, he was required to go forward.
This attitude, which was typical of Dutch doctors in dealing
with patients who become suicidal in response to illness, has had
an impact on the treatment of suicidal patients in the Nether-
lands. In the past decade, by making assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia easily available the Dutch have significantly reduced the
suicide rate of individuals over fifty years of age in the popula-
tion.21 The likelihood that these patients would have ended their
own lives if euthanasia was not available to them was one of the
justifications given by the Dutch doctors for providing such help.
Of course, euthanasia advocates can maintain that making
suicide "unnecessary" for physically ill individuals over fifty
years old is a benefit of legalization rather than a sign of abuse.
Such an attitude depends, of course, on whether an individual
believes that there are alternatives to assisted suicide or eutha-
nasia when dealing with the problems of older people who
become ill.
Among an older population, physical illness of all types is com-
mon and many older people who have trouble coping with physi-
cal illness become suicidal. In a culture accepting euthanasia,
such distress in older people is accepted as a legitimate reason
for dying. It may be more than ironic to describe euthanasia as
the Dutch cure for suicide.
The fourth type of slipping, which many individuals view as
the most troublesome of all, involves the increasing Dutch
acceptance of involuntary euthanasia. This practice derives
more from changes in doctors' attitude toward, and treatment of,
terminally ill patients when there is legal sanction for euthana-
sia than it does from simply making euthanasia more available
or from the inability to regulate the process.
The Remmelink Report's documentation of "involuntary
euthanasia" underlines the fact that it is often completely a doc-
tor and not a patient who determines the choice for death.
"Involuntary euthanasia" is a term that is disturbing to the
Dutch. If life is ended without the patient's request, the Dutch
do not consider it to be euthanasia because by their definition
euthanasia is voluntary. "Nonvoluntary euthanasia" is a term
used, although not by the Dutch, to describe a physician's ending
the life of a patient who is incapable of giving or refusing con-
sent. The Remmelink Report prefers the equally troubling
21. Herbert Hendin, Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and Suicide Prevention: The




expression "termination of the patient without explicit request"
to refer to euthanasia performed without consent on competent,
partially competent and incompetent patients.22
The Report revealed that, in over one thousand out of one hun-
dred and thirty thousand deaths in the Netherlands each year,
physicians admitted that they actively caused or hastened a
patient's death without any request from the patient.23 Twenty-
seven percent of physicians indicated that they had terminated
the lives of patients without a request from the patient to do so
and another 32% could conceive of doing so.
24
The impossibility of treating pain effectively was given as a
reason for killing the patient in 30% of the cases. The remaining
70% of patients were killed for a variety of other reasons, ranging
from the patent's "low quality of life" to the reason that "all treat-
ment was withdrawn but the patient did not die."25 The Remme-
link Commission (which authorized the Remmelink Report and
issued its own supplement to it) considered these cases not to be
morally troublesome because the suffering of the patients had
become "unbearable," and the patients presumably would have
died soon anyhow.26
According to the Remmelink Report, other forms of hastening
death without a patient's consent are also common practice in
the Netherlands. In over five thousand of forty-nine thousand
cases in which medical decisions were made at the end of a
patient's life, the doctor's explicit intention in administering pain
medication to the patient or withdrawing or withholding treat-
ment from the patient was to shorten life; in over eleven thou-
sand cases this was a "secondary goal."
27
In about twenty-five thousand cases, physicians made deci-
sions that might, or were intended to, end the lives of patients
without consulting them.28 The Remmelink Report minimized
this figure by stating that in 80% of the cases, the patient was
incompetent or only partially competent. 29 This left five thou-
sand cases, however, in which doctors made decisions that might,
22. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., supra note 3.
23. Id. at 64, table 6.7.
24. Id. at 58, table 6.1.
25. Id. at 64, table 6.7.
26. Henk ten Have et al., Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?, 22 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 34-38 (1992).
27. Keown, supra note 7, at 269, 270, table I.
28. VAN DER MAAS ET AL., supra note 3, at 134.
29. Id. at 75, table 7, 87. The figure of five thousand is based on the physician
interview part of the study. The figure based on death certificates, also used in the study,
is about three thousand and five hundred. Id. at 133, table 13.5. The figure based on the
interviews is considered more credible, although even the lower figure is alarming.
434 Vol. 35:427
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or were intended to, end the lives of competent patients without
consulting them.
In a significant number of these cases, physicians who did not
communicate with competent patients concerning decisions that
might or were intended to end their lives gave as a reason for not
doing so the fact that they had previously had some discussion of
the subject with the patient.3 0 Yet, it seems incomprehensible
that a physician would terminate the life of a competent patient
on the basis of some prior discussion without checking if the
patient still felt the same way.
The Remmelink Commission lumped together competent and
incompetent patients when stating that, in the overwhelming
majority of instances with respect to terminating a patient's life
without explicit request, patients were in the "dying phase" and,
therefore, ending their lives was normal medical practice.3 1 The
Commission concluded that termination of life without explicit
request from the patient should be regarded as acceptable medi-
cal practice and ought to be defined as "medical help in dying."
32
In practice, this means that in a deeply troubling number of
instances the criterion of voluntariness, and thus respect for the
patient's autonomy, lapses when the patient has entered the
dying phase of life, which is determined when the doctor decides
that the patient has only a few days, weeks or months to live. At
this point, the doctor is justified in, speeding up the patient's
dying process without consulting even competent patients.
It is at this juncture that the consistency of the Dutch criteria
seems to break down. A patient's autonomy is abandoned and
the only available rationale for ending the patient's life becomes
compassion for the patient's pain and suffering. Yet, since the
Royal Dutch Medical Association and the courts have agreed that
suffering is subjective, how could death be justified without con-
sulting the individual allegedly suffering? In these cases the
patient has no autonomy because the doctor has decided that the
quality of the patient's life is such that it is time for the patient
to die.33
Where this situation leads is reflected in the following case
example given by an attorney for the Dutch Euthanasia Society
as an illustration of why it was often necessary for doctors to end
the lives of competent patients without discussion with them.
The attorney spoke of a doctor who had terminated the life of a
30. Id. at 134, table 13.5.
31. R.J.M. Dillman & J.L. Legemaate, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The State of
the Legal Debate, 1 EuR. J. HEALTH CARE 81-87 (1984).
32. Id.
33. HENDiN, supra note 2.
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nun a few days before the nun would have died, because the nun
was in excruciating pain and her religious convictions did not
permit her to ask for death. The attorney did not reply, however,
when asked why the nun should not have been permitted to die
in the way she wanted and in accord with her faith.34
A number of Dutch euthanasia advocates have admitted that
practicing euthanasia with legal sanction has encouraged doctors
to feel that they can make life or death decisions without consult-
ing patients. Dutch euthanasia practitioners ask themselves the
following question: Would I want to live if I were that patient?
5
The question not only implies that a physician has a right to
make decisions about whose life is worth living, it also ignores
considerable research that has shown that doctor's consistently
underestimate patient perceptions as to their quality of life.
Dutch medical and legal opinion is moving in the direction of
greater acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia. The Remme-
link Commission recommended, and the Dutch government
accepted, that cases regarding the termination of a patient's life
without explicit patient request should be reported to the prose-
cutor just as are euthanasia cases. 6 Although physicians are not
guaranteed immunity from prosecution in such cases any more
than they were initially with euthanasia cases, the Commission
noted, and the courts may well agree, that the condition of the
patient places the physician in a situation of force majeure; end-
ing the patient's life may be justified by necessity just like
euthanasia. 7
The Royal Dutch Medical Association has canvassed opinion
on terminating the lives of patients with severe dementia .
3  It
appears that H.J.J. Leenan, a leading Dutch jurist and euthana-
sia advocate who in 1990 expressed the opinion that without a
patient request, termination of a patient's life is murder,3 9 has
changed his mind. Leenan now believes that in exceptional
cases, non-voluntary euthanasia attracts the force majeure
defense. 4° In several cases, prosecutors have already decided not
34. Id. at 79.
35. Id. at 80.
36. Brabants Dagblad, The Netherlands Is the Only Country with a Statutory Reg-
ulation: Euthanasia Law Barely Passed by Senate, THE HAGuE EDrroR, Dec. 1, 1993, at 1.
37. R.J.M. Dillman and J.L. Legemaate, supra note 31.
38. Brabants Dagblad, Dutch Doctors Support Life Termination in Dementia, 306
MED. & J. 1364 (1993).
39. H. J.J. Leenan, Dying With Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in
the Netherlands, 8 MED. & L. 520 (1989).
40. H. J.J. Leenan & Chris Ciesielski - Carlucci, Force Mojeure: Justification for
Active Termination of Life in the Case of Severely Handicapped Newborns after Foregoing
Treatment, CAmBRmGE Q. OF HEALTHCAR ETHics 271, 274 (1993).
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to prosecute a doctor where the doctor ended a patient's life with-
out the patient's request.4'
The fifth kind of slippage is in the standards of medical prac-
tice for the care of terminally ill patients, and in the role of
organized medicine in overseeing that care. It may seem evident
that when a country with a distinguished medical tradition has
embraced a system in which 50% of doctors do not report their
assisted suicide and euthanasia cases, 50% feel free to suggest
euthanasia to their patients, and 27% admit to putting patients
to death without their consent, nothing further need be said
about the erosion of medical standards in the care of terminally
ill patients.
The need of the Dutch medical establishment to minimize the
overwhelming evidence, including that of their own government-
sponsored report that catalogued thousands of cases where
patients were put to death inappropriately, requires explanation.
It was suggested to this author that political considerations were
perhaps a determining factor, and the author pursued this ques-
tion with Robert Dillmann, secretary for medical affairs for the
Royal Dutch Medical Association. Dillmann agreed that political
considerations were a determining factor. The Association and
the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society found themselves in a
struggle with the Christian Democratic party, whose leaders in
government the Society and Association view as fundamentally
opposed to euthanasia. Conceding that euthanasia cases are
often handled improperly would strengthen the Christian Demo-
cratic opposition. In addition, physicians throughout Europe
were savage in their criticism of Dutch euthanasia policies, thus
forcing the Dutch into a defensive position. Dillmann viewed the
Remmelink Report, despite its value, as providing ammunition
to individuals who wanted to attack euthanasia in the
Netherlands.42
Although virtually all of the individuals who have played a
role in advancing the cause of euthanasia on humanitarian
grounds were concerned about the problems in its implementa-
tion, these individuals seemed disinclined to express their doubts
publicly. Ren6 Diekstra, a pioneer in the introduction of assisted
suicide and euthanasia to the Netherlands4' had expressed to
this author his concerns that a system which he helped to father
put to death more people inappropriately than those who met
41. Keown, supra note 7.
42. HENDIN, supra note 2.
43. R. DEKSTRA & N. SPEIJER, HuLP Bu ZELFDODING: EEN ONDERZOCK NAAR
PROBLEMEN RoNDOM HULPVERLENING BiJ DE ZELFGEKOZEN DOOD (Help with suicide:
research into problems with assisted suicide] (1980).
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accepted criteria for assisted suicide and euthanasia. 4 Yet, in an
article on assisted suicide written for an English medical journal,
Diekstra contradicted everything he said to this author.45 The
article failed to mention the problems uncovered by the Remme-
link Report, and indeed even cited the report to conclude that, "in
almost all cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide, doctors do
comply with the rules of proper professional practice and con-
duct."46 When queried about this contradiction, Diekstra indi-
cated that political considerations also led him to mute his
criticism. Similar considerations influenced Diekstra's unwill-
ingness to testify in the Chabot case. Although Diekstra was
critical of the way Chabot handled the case, he thought it would
hurt the cause of assisted suicide and euthanasia to say so.
The Dutch medical establishment has created a climate that is
intolerant of criticism of Dutch euthanasia practices and has
pressured doctors not to write or say anything unfavorable.
Many physicians indeed believe that to criticize the practice
would jeopardize their careers.47
Political considerations have also clearly influenced the Rem-
melink Report. This author questioned Paul Van der Maas, the
project's principal investigator, about the thousands of cases in
which doctors made decisions that might or were intended to end
fully competent patients' lives without consulting the patients.
Why were doctors not challenged with regard to implausible
explanations for doing so? Why was there no recommendation
that doctors discuss their plans with competent patients? Van
der Maas replied that it was understood that doctors or policy
recommendations made in the interests of securing and retaining
the cooperation of the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the
participating doctors were not to be challenged. 4
Other responses by doctors warranted further inquiry, as well.
A physician's failure to obtain consultation, or failure to provide
alternative treatment plans to patients on the basis that, in all
cases, the patient's life was only shortened by a few hours or days
were all accepted without challenge. Van der Maas was con-
cerned that to do otherwise would compromise the neutrality of
the Remmelink investigation. Notably the study's interviewers,
who were primarily physicians themselves, appeared to be ques-
44. HENDIN, supra note 2.
45. R. Diekstra, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: Experience from the Nether-
lands, 25 ANNALs OF MED. 5 (1993).
46. Id. at 7.
47. HENDiN, supra note 2.
48. Id.
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tioning their peers in perhaps too collegial a manner, a descrip-
tion that Van der Maas understandably could not accept.
A leading Dutch palliative care expert considered the Remme-
link Report a political document. The expert found unbelievable
the conclusion that doctors only put to death patients when there
was no other alternative. 49 The expert pointed out that neither
the doctors who were interviewed for the report nor the individu-
als who interviewed the doctors were qualified to make such
judgments.
Despite its limitations, the Remmelink Report is a valuable
study. The unfortunate consequence of the Dutch medical estab-
lishment's efforts to minimize the significance of its findings,
however, is to mislead their own population and to encourage
some American advocates into thinking that the Dutch have pro-
vided a model that the United States should follow.
What parallels can be seen already or are likely to be seen in
the Dutch experience to the American experience? The Ameri-
can legal system as well as the American medical and ethical val-
ues would make it difficult for society to make a distinction
between assisted suicide and euthanasia. Patients wanting to
die make no such distinction, and since many of them cannot
swallow medication, they have only one choice. If society recog-
nizes a right to assisted suicide and/or euthanasia, it would not
find it easy to exclude people who are suffering but who are not
terminally ill from the practices. Terminal illness is not, in any
case, a definable medical category. It is even less so when the
illness is "terminal" because patients exercise their right to
refuse treatment.
The leading medical advocates of assisted suicide in the
United States have written model proposals that make clear that
legalization of assisted suicide for terminally ill patients is a first
step only. Timothy Quill and five co-authors, for example, in the
New England Journal of Medicine, call for legalization of eutha-
nasia as well as assisted suicide for "competent patients suffer-
ing not only from terminal illness," but also for those with
"incurable, debilitating disease who voluntarily request to end
their lives.""° An "incurable, debilitating disease" would include
conditions like diabetes and arthritis.
The Chabot case aroused such concern outside of the Nether-
lands that society is not likely to see pressure for assisted suicide
or euthanasia for distress unaccompanied by physical illness for
49. Z. ZYLICZ, PERSONAL COMMUNICATION (1996).




some time. Psychological distress, however, is most often at the
basis of a patient's request for assisted suicide even when the
patient has a physical illness. If legalization occurs, the combi-
nation of the two is as likely to be accepted as justification for
euthanasia here as it is in the Netherlands.
There is every reason to believe that in this country, just as in
the Netherlands, granting physicians the power to end life will
encourage many to make such decisions without consulting
patients. Some physicians admit to having done so already.51
The Dutch model and Dutch guidelines have been accepted as
models for the Oregon law and most of the state laws being con-
sidered in this country to legalize assisted suicide and euthana-
sia. Callahan and White reviewed the bills in twelve states
considering assisted suicide, many of which were modelled after
the Oregon law. They found that with regard to safeguards con-
cerning informed consent, mental competence, voluntariness and
restriction of eligibility to the terminally ill, all twelve bills had
the same failings as the Oregon law. Callahan and White con-
cluded that the bills were written primarily for the protection of
doctors not patients.52
The American cases of assisted suicide published as models
intended to persuade Americans of the benefits of legalization
reveal the same problems as Dutch cases and indicate that
American doctors are no different than Dutch doctors when
deciding to utilize assisted suicide. In Timothy Quill's case of
"Diane," made famous by publication in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine, the doctor's initial response to a leukemia
patient's desire to reject treatment and later a request for
assisted suicide was to commiserate with the patient on the
unfairness of life and to refer her to the Hemlock Society. 53 He
later provides the patient with the pills recommended by the
society, but an analysis of his account reveals the degree to
which his own predilections determined the outcome. 4
Another prominent American case featured as the cover story
of a New York Times magazine article in 1993 described the
assisted suicide of Louise, a Seattle woman whose death was
arranged by her doctor and the Reverend Ralph Mero, head of
51. It's Over, Debbie, 279 JAMA 259-72 (1988).
52. Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Sui-
cide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RicH. L. Rzv. 1 (1996).
53. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision-Mak-
ing, 324 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 691-94 (1991).
54. P. Wesley, Dying Safely, 8 IssuEs L. & MED. 467-85 (1993); Hendin, supra note
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Compassion in Dying, a group that champions assisted suicide. 55
Compassion in Dying's guidelines state that its representatives
evaluate patients prior to making the decision to assist suicide,
never encourage patients to choose assisted suicide, and do not
actively become the agent for suicide. Yet, the story reveals that,
(1) Mero agreed to help assist in the patient's suicide even before
meeting her; (2) Mero advised the patient to act quickly, and (3)
he was prepared to use a plastic bag to induce the patient's suffo-
cation if the pills did not work. The failure is not simply Mero's
violation of his own guidelines, but of the illusion that such
guidelines truly operate to protect patients.5"
Jack Kevorkian's cases suggest how free some doctors will be
to establish their own guidelines. In some of Kevorkian's cases,
the push for the patient's death came from relatives; in others no
medical pathology was found upon autopsy, and in virtually no
case were any possible alternatives to assisted suicide ade-
quately explored. Although Kevorkian may seem eccentric, it is
worth knowing that in the Netherlands, a small number of physi-
cians are attracted to euthanasia and do a great number of cases.
One individual admits to handling close to one hundred such
cases, while another is proud to have handled many times that
number of cases.57
The public has the illusion that legalizing assisted suicide and
euthanasia will give individuals greater autonomy. The Dutch
experience teaches that the reverse is true. Legal sanction for
assisted suicide and euthanasia actually increases the power and
control of doctors who can suggest or encourage the practice, not
propose obvious alternatives, ignore patients' ambivalence and
even put to death patients who have not requested it.
Recent changes by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in the
suggested guidelines for euthanasia suggest that the Dutch
would like to correct some of the abuses in their system without
acknowledging that they have problems. It will probably not be
possible for the Dutch to back away completely from legally sanc-
tioned euthanasia. Euthanasia, once sanctioned, creates its own
irrational demand that some individuals are all too willing to
meet. A medical system that develops around the easy option of
euthanasia is hard to reverse.
The Dutch, however, accepted euthanasia as a way of dealing
with terminal illness before the developments in palliative care
55. L. Belkin, There's No Simple Suicide, N.Y. TIMES MAG., November 14, 1993, at
50.
56. HENDmN, supra note 9.
57. HENDr, supra note 2.
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of the past decade. Given the Dutch experience and the discon-
tent of Dutch doctors with legal regulation, it is far from sure
that the Dutch would follow the same course if they were start-
ing now. Our society has an opportunity to learn from the Dutch
mistakes. It would be sad simply to repeat them.
